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ARTICLE 
 
The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property:  
The Accommodation Principle 
MICHAEL C. BLUMM* 
The public trust doctrine has been attacked by libertarian 
property rights advocates for being grounded on shaky history,1 
inefficient,2 a threat to private property,3 and inconsistent with 
 
* Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. I thank Eric Freyfogel for 
comments on a draft of this paper, Mary Wood for the inspiration, Elizabeth 
Dawson, 2L, Lewis and Clark Law School, for help with the footnotes, and the 
Lewis and Clark summer research program for support. 
1. See James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths: A History of 
the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y F. 1 (2007) (alleging that 
the public trust doctrine’s roots in Roman and English law are mythical, at least 
to the extent of preserving public rights; that American public trust law is 
grounded on a cases later overruled or misguided; and, that although the 
doctrine’s evolution in the 19th century from tidal to navigable-in-fact waters 
was permissible, its 20th century evolution into a vehicle for resource 
preservation is a dangerous threat to both property rights and democracy). See 
infra note 13. 
2. Jedidiah Brewer & Gary D. Libecap, Property Rights and the Public 
Trust Doctrine in Environmental Protection and Natural Resource 
Conservation, 53 AUSTL. J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 1 (2009) (claiming that 
the public trust doctrine is less efficient than alternative allocation approaches 
like marketplace transactions or condemnation because it produces 
uncompensated redistribution, encourages litigation, and undermines 
settlements). 
3. Randy T. Simmons, Property and the Public Trust Doctrine, in 39 PROP. 
& ENV’T. RES. CENTER POL’Y SERIES 1 (2007) (charging that the public trust 
doctrine equips judges and legislatures with the power to reduce property rights 
to the whims of changing public perceptions); George P. Smith & Michael 
Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations Within a 
Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REV. 307, 333 (2006) (claiming that private 
property rights are compromised or eliminated if unprotected by constitutional 
compensation). 
1
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the rule of law.4  Some libertarians see application of the public 
trust doctrine as an evisceration of private property rights.5  In 
reality, such claims are hyperbolic.  The doctrine actually 
functions to mediate between public and private rights, and thus 
is hardly the antithesis of private property; instead, it functions 
to transform, not eradicate, private property rights. 
This mediating function was well described over a quarter-
century ago by the California Supreme Court in its famous Mono 
Lake decision as an effort to accommodate both private property 
and public concerns through continuous state supervision of trust 
resources, regardless of whether they were in public or private 
ownership.6  Courts applying the Mono Lake doctrine demand all 
feasible accommodations to preserve and protect trust assets,7 but 
 
4. James L. Huffman, Background Principles and the Rule of Law, 35 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 27 (2008) (maintaining that employing background property 
principles like the public trust doctrine as a defense to takings claims is 
inconsistent with the rule of law because it is a distortion of the common law 
process to suggest that state courts and legislatures can modify or abandon 
established common law principles in the name of present day notions of the 
public interest and public rights). 
5. See Simmons, supra note 3, at 13 (charging that the effect of the public 
trust doctrine on private property eliminates the fundamental right to exclude, 
and without that right, property devolves back to the open-access commons from 
which it emerged, leading to inevitable overuse and environmental destruction). 
6. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 712, 
723 (Cal. 1983) [hereinafter Mono Lake] (noting that “the core of the public trust 
doctrine is the state’s authority as sovereign to exercise a continuous 
supervision and control over the navigable waters of the state and the lands 
underlying those waters.” Previous case law demonstrates the continuing power 
of the state as administrator of the trust, a power which extends to revocation of 
previously granted rights or to the enforcement of the trust against lands long 
thought free of the trust.) 
7. See id. at 712, 728 (affirming the authority of the state to grant non-
vested usufructuary rights to appropriate water even if the diversions harm 
public trust uses but requiring courts and agencies approving such diversions to 
consider the effect of the diversions on trust uses and attempt, so far as feasible, 
to avoid or minimize any harm to those interests. “The state has an affirmative 
duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water 
resources, and to protect public trust uses wherever feasible.”); see also Ctr. for 
Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 601 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2008) (recognizing that members of the public have the right to question 
agencies’ decisions because they do not always strike an appropriate balance 
between protecting trust resources and accommodating other legitimate public 
interests); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 93 P.3d 643, 658 (Haw. 2004) 
[hereinafter Waiahole Ditch II] (vacating Water Commission’s decision 
regarding allocation of water resources in part for failure to require the parties 
to justify the proposed water use in light of the trust purposes and weigh 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/3
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they do not attempt to eliminate private property.  In fact, 
virtually all applications of the public trust doctrine leave 
possession of private property unchanged.8 
The doctrine does, however, often alter development rights, 
but those rights are only one stick in the property bundle.9  
Equating diminished development rights with a loss of all private 
property rights is a categorical mistake, one that perhaps serves 
the libertarian project of erecting the just compensation clause of 
the Fifth Amendment as a bulwark against continued efforts to 
modernize property law,10 but it also overlooks the many 
dimensions of property rights and obligations.11 
 
competing public and private water uses on a case-by-case basis); In re Water 
Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 452, 454 (Haw. 2000) [hereinafter 
Waiahole Ditch I] (citing Mono Lake as instructive while positing that Hawaii’s 
public trust doctrine may require even more protections than California’s, but 
still indicating a preference for accommodating both instream and offstream 
uses where feasible); Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 
A.2d 112, 121 (N.J. 2005) (requiring upland private owner to provide public 
access to the water even though public use of the upland sands is subject to an 
accommodation of the interests of the owner). 
8. See infra notes 35-73 and accompanying text. 
9. See Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a 
Community-Based Resource, 32 ENVTL. L. 773 (2002) (examining and finding 
wanting the traditional property bundle of sticks that is taught in law school 
and arguing for an expanded bundle that includes community obligations). 
10. The leading commentary on the use of the Fifth Amendment as a 
limitation on land use and environmental regulation is RICHARD EPSTEIN, 
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
11. See, e.g., Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks, supra note 9; ERIC 
T. FREYFOGEL, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON THE 
OWNERSHIP OF LAND 1-28, 84-104 (2007) (emphasizing that land ownership 
entails public responsibilities in an interconnected and ever-changing world) 
[hereinafter FREYFOGEL, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY]. See also ERIC T. FREYFOGEL, 
THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD 101-34 (2003) 
[hereinafter FREYFOGEL, THE LAND WE SHARE]. On the multi-dimensional nature 
of property, see, e.g., Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
821, 870 (2009) (describing the need to strike the right balance between our 
obligations toward others and our inclination to favor our own interests when 
lawmakers make land use decisions); Joseph William Singer, The Ownership 
Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments and Just Obligations, 30 
HARV. L. REV. 309, 314, 328-38 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court in 
Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005), returned to a citizenship 
model of property that presumes part of what it means to be a member of society 
is that owners have obligations as well as rights); Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a 
Public Conversation, Not a Lockean Soliloquy: A Role for Intellectual and Legal 
History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L. 1095, 1108 (1996) (emphasizing that 
the pre-Lockean medieval world generally conceived property ownership as 
3
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The public trust doctrine has a special role to play in 
moderating development rights because it is, as suggested by 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Commission, a background principle of property law.12  
Given the antiquity of the doctrine,13 the public trust is well 
suited to its role as a background principle.  A number of post-
Lucas decisions have confirmed Justice Scalia’s insight that the 
public trust serves to limit property owners’ reasonable 
expectations to such an extent that loss of their development 
rights does not give rise to constitutional compensation.14  In fact, 
the trust doctrine as a background principle has had a 
 
limited by social obligations and that individual control was in the nature of a 
social trust); John E. Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New 
Definition of Property, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (1986); Jeremy Waldron, What Is 
Private Property?, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (1985); Joseph L. Sax, 
Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV. 481 (1983); 
Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in Nomos XXII 69 (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman, eds., 1980); Francis S. Philbrick, Changing 
Conceptions in Property Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691 (1938); P.J. PROUDHON, 
WHAT IS PROPERTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT AND OF 
GOVERNMENT (Benj. R. Tucker trans., 1876). 
12. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (suggesting 
that uncompensated regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of 
land must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles 
of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership); 
See also id. at 1031 (stating that the state of South Carolina, “if it sought to 
restrain Lucas in a common-law action for public nuisance . . . must identify 
background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses he 
now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently found.”) 
13. See Harrison C. Dunning, The Antiquity of the Public Right, in 2 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, ch. 29 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley, eds., 3rd 
ed. 2009). Professor Huffman’s claim that the public trust doctrine is historically 
illegitimate, James L, Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths: A History of 
the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y F. 1 (2007), largely 
retraced ground trod in two secondary sources: Patrick Devaney, Title, Jus 
Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13 
(1976); and Glen MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in Civil and Common 
Law: Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines that 
Don’t Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511 (1975). No original historical 
research was evident in Huffman’s article. 
14. Palazzolo v. State, No. 88-0297, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 108 at *55-56 
(R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005) (holding that the public trust doctrine can block a 
tidelands development without compensation); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003) (same, except that the tidelands were 
artificially created). See Erin Ryan, Palazzolo, The Public Trust, and the 
Property Owner’s Reasonable Expectations: Takings and the South Carolina 
Marsh Island Bridge Debate, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 121 (2006). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/3
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considerably larger effect on regulatory takings jurisprudence 
than the Lucas holding that regulations causing complete 
economic wipeouts are categorical takings.15 
This result has been disturbing to some libertarian property 
advocates because they assume that the public trust doctrine is 
the antithesis of property rights, an assumption that dovetails 
with their fixation on the just compensation clause as the sine 
qua non of property.  But property rights also include the rights 
of possession, use, and alienation16 and are limited by the non-
injury rule to neighbors and the community.17  So, a loss of the 
right to constitutional compensation would hardly produce a 
complete loss of all property rights.  Thus, even where it functions 
to deny landowner compensation claims, the operation of the 
public trust doctrine should not be viewed as the equivalent of a 
permanent physical occupation of property, which is a categorical 
taking.18 
 
15. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The 
Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 367 (2005) (maintaining that the categorical takings rule 
articulated in Lucas has turn[ed] out to be “much less significant than the 
categorical defenses the decision authorized.”) 
16. See generally A.M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112-24 (1961) (discussing incidents of land ownership, 
including rights to possession, use, management, income, capital, security, and 
alienation). 
17. The classic statement about the limits on private property comes from 
Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 
1851: “All property in this commonwealth . . . is derived directly or indirectly 
from the government, and held subject to those general regulations, which are 
necessary to the common good and general welfare.” Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 
Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 85 (1851). See also id. at 84-85.   
We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of a well 
ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute and 
unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his 
use of it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal 
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their 
property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. . . ”.  
Id.  
18. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 
(1982) (involving cable television wires and boxes, causing $1.00 in damage).  
Several recent decisions by the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit 
have considered federal restrictions on state water rights to protect endangered 
fish populations to amount to physical occupations, but in none of these cases 
did the courts consider the limitations the California public trust doctrine places 
on water rights in the state. See Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage Comm. v. 
5
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This article shows how the public trust doctrine functions 
alongside private property by examining representative case law 
in various states, which reveals a vibrant federalism in terms of 
how the background principle of the public trust doctrine affects 
private rights.19  Part I begins with an examination of case law, 
beginning in 1821 with the seminal case of Arnold v. Mundy, in 
which the New Jersey Supreme Court began to establish a lineal 
definition of the public trust doctrine by delineating between 
public and private rights in submerged lands according to tidal 
influence.  In the nineteenth century, this idea was quickly 
extended to all waterways that are navigable-in-fact.  Part II 
moves beyond these lineal definition cases to those that adopt a 
more conceptual division between public and private rights 
through distinguishing between jus public and jus privatum, 
which allows trust duties to be imposed on private landowners 
without displacing their fee simple titles.  Part III looks at 
another feature of the coexistence of public and private rights by 
examining those cases, beginning with the lodestar U.S. Supreme 
Court decision of Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, which 
establish exceptions allowing small privatization of public trust 
resources.  Part IV turns to decisions that preserve trust 
resources by interpreting the application of the trust to transform 
a landowner’s fee simple absolute into a defeasible fee.  Finally, 
Part V explains those decisions, epitomized by beach access cases, 
which recognize the trust doctrine and the related doctrine of 
 
United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001) (deciding that federal restrictions on water 
diversions that reduced water deliveries to irrigators called for in federal 
contracts was a physical occupation, apparently overlooking Mono Lake’s 
disclaimer of any vested water rights under California law); Casitas Municipal 
Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (concluding that 
federal restrictions requiring a water district to channel water through a fish 
ladder could be a physical occupation taking, in part because the court thought, 
as a federal court, it could not interpret the effect of the state’s public trust 
doctrine on the state water right); Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, 
583 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (allowing a takings claim to proceed concerning 
federal restrictions that reduced federal water deliveries as called for in federal 
contracts without considering the effect of the public trust doctrine). 
19. One recent critique of the background principles concept managed to 
avoid almost any discussion of recent case law on background principles. See 
James L. Huffman, Background Principles and the Rule of Law, 35 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 1 (2008) (alleging that the use of background principles as takings defenses 
distorts Justice Scalia’s meaning in his Lucas decision and disregards the Fifth 
Amendment’s takings clause). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/3
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customary rights to superimpose a public easement on private 
land titles.  This examination of public trust case law shows that 
the public trust doctrine has had a transformative effect on 
private property rights, but it has not functioned, as is sometimes 
alleged, to eliminate private property. 20  Actually, the doctrine 
serves as a prime example of the common law’s ability to evolve to 
meet the felt necessities of the times.21 
I.   THE TRUST DOCTRINE AS A LINEAL DIVISION 
BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS 
The American public trust doctrine, inherited from England, 
was first recognized by Chief Justice Andrew Kirkpatrick of the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in Arnold v. Mundy, a test case in 
which Arnold, a riparian landowner who had planted oysters in a 
tidal reach of the Raritan River, claimed that Mundy, who 
harvested the oysters, trespassed in doing so.22  In a decision that 
the U.S. Supreme Court later described as “entitled to great 
 
20. See Simmons, supra note 3, at 13, 17. 
21. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover Publications 
1991) (1881).   
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt 
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, 
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices 
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to 
do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be 
governed.  
Id. Eric Freyfogle has traced some of the most significant shifts in the common 
law of property, noting especially the major shifts resulting from 
industrialization and westward expansion. FREYFOGEL, THE LAND WE SHARE, 
supra note 11, at 37-99. He also explained the massive shift that occurred in 
trespass during the antebellum era, when courts and legislatures curtailed the 
public’s right to use unenclosed land. FREYFOGEL, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra 
note 11, at 29-60. See also Eric T. Freyfogel, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (arguing that lawmakers are morally 
obligated to revise property laws over time so that the law enforces only 
property rights that foster the common good, attacking the notion of a natural 
law of property which he claims is a product of majoritarian law). 
22. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 8, 32 (1821). In 1821, Chief Justice 
Kirkpatrick was in his twenty-third year as a member of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court and his seventeenth year as Chief Justice. 
7
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weight” and the product of “great deliberation and research,”23 the 
court ruled that Mundy had no title to the submerged land in 
question because the sovereign owned the beds of tidal waters in 
New Jersey, just as it did in England.24 
Arnold v. Mundy began a lineal division of public and private 
submerged lands according to a waterbody’s physical 
characteristics.25  Arnold declared tidal submerged lands to be 
public, but well before the end of the Nineteenth Century, other 
state courts expanded public submerged lands to include waters 
that were navigable-in-fact.26  The U.S. Supreme Court quickly 
ratified this result,27 a considerable expansion in scope that 
brought the concept of state sovereign ownership to vast inland 
waterways.28 
 
23. Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 418 (1842) (approving the 
rationale of Arnold and suggesting that the rule that the states owned the beds 
of tidal waters applied to all original states as successors to the English Crown). 
24. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 50. 
25. In Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), the Supreme Court 
expanded Martin’s recognition of state ownership of submerged tidal lands 
beyond the original thirteen states as successors to the English Crown to all 
subsequent states, ruling that the federal government held tidal submerged 
lands in trust for future states prior to statehood. 
26. See, e.g, Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810) (concluding that it 
would be “highly unreasonable” to limit the scope of navigability to tidal 
waters); McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1, 18, 30 (1856) (recognizing 
navigability-in-fact, not the presence of the tide, as the defining characteristic of 
public waters when determining landowner’s title for riparian parcel to extend 
only to the high water mark); Home v. Richards, 8 Va. (4 Call) 441 (1798) 
(concluding that the beds of navigable rivers belong to the commonwealth and 
as such cannot be conveyed); Town of Ravenswood v. Flemings, 22 W.Va. 52 
(1883) (acknowledging the navigable-in-fact test as controlling when limiting the 
title of riparian owners along the Ohio River to the high water mark and 
declaring the bed as vested in the state); Ingraham v. Wilkinson, 21 Mass (4 
Pick.) 268, 284 (1826) (stating the common law to be that navigable waters 
“invariably and exclusively belong to the public” while not directly deciding the 
issue because no navigable river was in dispute). 
27. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443 (1851) (upholding a 
congressional extension of admiralty jurisdiction to nontidal waters used for 
commerce); Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876) (rejecting the 
distinction between tidal and non tidal waters for the purposes of navigability 
and sovereign ownership, but leaving to the states the ultimate disposition of 
their submerged lands). 
28. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 489, 484-85 (1988) 
(confirming that lands beneath both tidal and navigable-in-fact waters were 
state-owned public trust lands). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/3
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The upshot of Arnold and its progeny was a lineal division of 
public and private rights.  The beds of waters influenced by the 
tides or that are navigable-in-fact were state-owned in trust for 
the public, while lands submerged beneath non tidal, non-
navigable waters could be privately owned.  Sovereign lands and 
private lands existed side-by-side, with the lands critically 
important for navigation and fishing in public hands. 
Many states adhere to the lineal delineation of public versus 
private ownership described above.29  However, judicial 
interpretation of navigability has proved malleable, as many 
courts now consider any waters suitable for recreation to meet 
the navigability test, regardless of whether they ever supported 
traditional commercial enterprises.30  Moreover, in some states 
the definition of navigable waters is elastic in order to account for 
changes due to human interventions like dams and levees.31  In 
some states, courts have extended the public trust doctrine 
beyond navigable and tidal waters to include non-navigable 
waters,32 groundwater,33 and parklands.34  Thus, there is no 
 
29. For states recognizing navigability as controlling, see supra note 26 and 
accompanying text; see also State v. Slotness, 185 N.W.2d 530, 532 (Minn. 1971) 
(noting that “the state owns the bed of navigable waters below the low-water 
mark in trust for the people.”) For states adhering to the tidal test see Hooker v. 
Cummings, 20 Johns. 90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822) (recognizing non tidal rivers as 
private, even if still subject to public use); Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9 
(1849) (maintaining the common law doctrine that riparian owners along 
freshwater rivers own to the middle thread of the stream, and distinguishing 
freshwater bed ownership from tidal bed ownership, which remains in the 
state). 
30. See, e.g., Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 
(Mont. 1984); State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659 (Ark. 1980); Parks v. Cooper, 676 
N.W.2d 823 (S.D. 2004). See generally Dunning, supra note 13, § 32.03(a), at 32-
8 (noting that at least ten states have adopted the “pleasure boat” test for 
navigability). 
31. See, e.g., Ark. River Rights Comm. v. Echubby Lake Hunting Club, 126 
S.W.3d 738 (Ark. 2003) (ruling that the public gained recreational access rights 
when a dam permanently flooded riparian lands); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119-20 (S.C. 2003) (holding that the public trust 
doctrine extended to waters in man-made canals and their extension by erosion). 
32. See, e.g., Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712, 727-30 (Cal. 1983) (public trust 
extends to non-navigable waters that affect navigable waters); Parks v. Cooper, 
676 N.W.2d 823 (S.D. 2004) (all water in the state is owned by the public and 
managed by the state under the public trust doctrine). 
33. See Waiahole Ditch I, 9 P.3d at 409 (groundwater); 10 VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 10, § 1390(5) (2010) (it is the policy of the state that the groundwater 
resources of the state are held in trust for the public); Great Lakes St Lawrence 
9
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uniform interpretation of this lineal, geographic division between 
public and private rights, and there seems to be an evolution 
toward a more expansive delineation on the public side of the 
divide. 
II.   THE TRUST DOCTRINE AS A CONCEPTIONAL 
DIVISION BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
RIGHTS 
The lineal definition of the scope of the public trust doctrine 
is in some jurisdictions complemented by a more abstract 
division: where the doctrine applies, it works a kind of 
conceptional severance into jus publicum and jus privatum 
estates.35  A leading example is the California Supreme Court’s 
1971 decision in Marks v. Whitney, where the court rejected an 
attempt by a landowner to fill tidelands over the objection of a 
neighbor.36  According to Marks, the effect of the public trust 
doctrine’s application to wetlands was to divide the landowners 
property into two different estates,37 similar to what occurs in the 
 
River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 110-342, 122 Stat. 3739 (2008); id. § 1.2 
(defining regulated basin water to include groundwater); id. § 1.3(1)(a) 
(declaring basin waters to be precious public resources shared and held in trust 
by the states; id. § 1.3(1)(f) (instructing compact states to protect, restore, 
improve, and manage to renewable but finite waters of the basin for the use, 
benefit, and enjoyment of all their citizens, including generations yet to come). 
See also Bridgett Donegan, The Great Lakes Compact and the Public Trust 
Doctrine: Beyond Michigan and Wisconsin Common Law, 24 J. ENVTL. L & 
LITIG. 455 (2009). 
34. See, e.g., Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 15 (Ill. 1970); 
Friends of Van Cortland Park v. New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 2001). 
35. See Dictionary.com, jus publicum, http://dictionary.reference.com 
/browse/jus+publicum (last visited Aug. 18, 2010) (according to one account, is a 
right of public ownership; specifically, the right of ownership of real property 
that is held in trust by the government for the public); see also Dictionary.com, 
jus privatum, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/jus+privatum?qsrc=2446 
(last visited Aug. 18, 2010) (a right of private ownership). 
36. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 381 (Cal. 1971)  (Marks was a 
notable public trust decision because it recognized public standing to enforce 
trust obligations, and described the public trust as a flexible doctrine able to 
evolve to accommodate changing public needs, such as preservation of wetlands 
in their natural state). 
37. See id. (distinguishing the landowner’s jus privatum from the jus 
publicum of the people). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/3
BLUMM  
2010] THE ACCOMMODATION PRINCIPLE 659 
case of financial trust.38  The landowner’s recognized jus privatum 
recognized rights such as possession and alienation, but that 
estate was burdened by the public’s jus publicum rights, which 
restrained private development that was inconsistent with public 
rights.39 
A number of state courts have employed Marks v. Whitney’s 
recognition that the public trust doctrine’s effect is to sever 
property into two distinct estates.  For example, the New York 
Supreme Court relied upon the jus publicum/jus privatum 
distinction to order a landowner to remove a fill he placed in 
Manhasset Bay.40  The South Carolina Supreme Court used the 
same conceptual severance to deny a takings claim concerning a 
denial of a fill permit for artificially created submerged lands in 
Myrtle Beach.41  And the Michigan Supreme Court invoked the 
jus publicum/privatum dichotomy in ruling that the public trust 
doctrine gave the public access rights on privately owned lands 
along the Great Lakes below the mean high water mark.42 
 
38. When money or land is held in a traditional trust, the trustee has legal 
title to the property, while the beneficiaries have equitable title. See generally 
AMERICAN LAW INST., RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS (THIRD) (1992). The property is 
thus conceptually severed into two estates, and the trustee has judicially 
enforceable obligations to the beneficiaries. 
39. See Marks, 491 P.2d at 380-81.   
The power of the state to control, regulate and utilize its navigable 
waterways and the lands lying beneath them, when acting within the 
terms of the trust, is absolute . . . it is within the province of the trier of 
fact to determine whether any particular use made or asserted by 
Whitney in or over these tidelands would constitute an infringement 
either upon the jus privatum of Marks or upon the jus publicum of the 
people. It is also within the province of the trier of fact to determine 
whether any particular use to which Marks wishes to devote his 
tidelands constitutes an unlawful infringement upon the jus publicum 
therein.  
Id. 
40. Arnolds Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 310 N.Y.S 2d 541, 547 (Sup. Ct. 1970). 
41. McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119 (S.C. 2003).  
42. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Mich. 2005). 
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III.  THE TRUST DOCTRINE’S EXCEPTIONS 
ALLOWING PRIVATIZATION OF SOME TRUST 
RESOURCES 
The signature American public trust doctrine case is Illinois 
Central Railroad v. Illinois, an 1892 decision of the Supreme 
Court, in which Justice Stephen Field authored a majority 
opinion for the Court that held that the state could not privatize 
most of the Chicago harbor without violating the public trust 
doctrine.43  This decision has probably energized the libertarians 
against the public trust doctrine because the Court used the 
doctrine to justify a preference for public ownership over 
private.44  But Justice Field’s decision also authorized 
privatization of trust resources when 1) the conveyance furthered 
public purposes, and 2) there was no substantial effect on 
remaining trust resources.45  The effect of these exceptions was to 
 
43. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452, 460, 465 (1892) (Shiras, J., 
dissenting). Although the Supreme Court split 4-3 on the case (with Chief 
Justice Fuller and Justice Blatchford recusing themselves), all seven justices 
believed that the public trust doctrine applied to the state’s conveyance of the 
submerged lands to the railroad. But the three dissenters believed that the state 
possessed sufficient regulatory authority to ensure that the public’s rights could 
be protected despite the conveyance. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas Merrill, 
The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in 
Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 709 (2004) (a thorough discussion of the 
background and outcome of the case, explaining that the railroad’s motivations 
in lobbying for the statute granting the submerged lands was to fend off 
competitors, including one rival headed by Melvin Fuller before he became Chief 
Justice; that the state of Illinois had neither the financial resources nor 
expertise to develop the Chicago Harbor; that downstate legislators favored the 
grant to the railroad because a state 7% gross receipts tax would have generated 
money to fund downstate projects; and, that railroad probably engaged in 
bribery in securing passage of the legislation). 
44. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.   
The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole 
people are interested, like navigable waters and soils underneath them, 
so as to leave them entirely under the use or control of private parties . . . 
than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of 
government and the preservation of the peace.  
Id. 
45. Id. (approving trust dispositions to private parties in the instance of 
parcels, for the improvement of navigation and use of the waters, or when 
parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what 
remains). See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475-76, 482-
83 (1988) (It has never been entirely clear whether Justice Field’s opinion was 
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authorize small privatizations of trust resources where the bulk 
of the trust resources remain public.46 
Many cases have adopted the Illinois Central exceptions.  For 
example, in Boone v. Kingsbury, the California Supreme Court 
upheld the state’s issuance of oil drilling leases on trust lands, 
concluding that the oil derricks would not substantially interfere 
with the trust, especially in light of the state’s ability to remove 
them upon a finding of substantial interference.47  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court upheld a conveyance of submerged Lake 
Michigan land to a private company in City of Milwaukee v. State 
because it was part and parcel of a larger scheme, entirely public 
in nature, designed to enable the city to construct its outer harbor 
in aid of navigation and commerce.48  Additionally, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court, in State v. Southern Sand and Material Co., 
upheld the legislature’s authority to authorize the sale of sand 
and gravel from navigable streambeds because it cannot be 
claimed that the disposal or sale of sand and gravel is a 
relinquishment of the state’s control over the common property, 
or that it impairs the right of common enjoyment, or that it 
interferes with navigation.49 
The lesson of the Illinois Central exceptions seems to be that 
the public trust doctrine does not demand wholesale public 
ownership of trust resources.  So long as the public purposes 
underlying the trust doctrine are maintained, small privatization 
is permissible.50  In effect, the result is the public trust doctrine 
 
grounded in state or federal law, although the Supreme Court has assumed it 
was a state law interpretation, even though Field did not expressly rely on state 
law). See Crystal S. Chase, The Illinois Central Public Trust Doctrine and 
Federal Common Law: An Unconventional View, 16 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 113 (2010) (arguing that Illinois Central was based on federal 
common law). 
46. In this way the public trust doctrine is similar to the riparian water 
rights doctrine, which allows small diversions so long as there is no substantial 
interference with the rights of neighbors or the flow of the stream. See Carol M. 
Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 360-61 
(1989). 
47. Boone v. Kingsbury, 273 P. 797 (Cal. 1928). 
48. City of Milwaukee v. Wisconsin, 214 N.W.2d 820, 830 (Wis. 1923). 
49. Arkansas v. S. Sand and Material Co., 167 S.W. 854, 856 (Ark. 1914). 
50. See infra Part IV, discussing cases in which private parties could retain 
ownership of trust lands if they maintained public water-related uses, as 
specified in their land grants. 
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prescribes a co-existence of public and private uses.  The 
libertarian mind seems to have overlooked this reality.51 
IV.  THE TRUST DOCTRINE’S TRANSFORMATION OF 
FEE SIMPLES INTO DEFEASIBLE FEES 
Where trust resources are privatized, trust obligations do not 
necessarily disappear, as evident in the discussion of Marks v. 
Whitney above.52  In both Massachusetts and Vermont, the courts 
have interpreted the effect of the public trust on filled submerged 
lands to transform the fee simple absolute of landowners into 
defeasible fees.  For example, in Boston Waterfront Development 
Corp. v. Commonwealth, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court ruled that the public interest in such formerly submerged 
lands transcends the ordinary rules of property law.53  
Consequently, the court interpreted the nineteenth century 
statutes authorizing fills in Boston Harbor for wharfing to grant 
only fee simples subject to the condition subsequent that the 
lands be used for the public purpose of maritime commerce.54  
Thus, the lands were subject to forfeiture if converted to private 
condominiums.55 
 Similarly, in Vermont v. Central Vermont Railway, the 
Vermont Supreme Court ruled that the railroad’s attempted 
conveyance of over a mile of Lake Champlain waterfront for real 
estate development was a violation of the public trust doctrine.56  
As in Boston Harbor, the filled railroad-owned lands remained 
burdened with the public trust, even though they were now 
privately owned.57  Consequently, the court ruled that the state 
had the duty to continuously supervise these shorelands to 
 
51. See sources cited supra note 3. 
52. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
53. Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Massachusetts, 393 N.E.2d 356, 367 
(Mass. 1979). 
54. Id. at 367. 
55. Id. at 366. 
56. Vermont v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989). 
57. Id. at 1133-34 (deciding that 19th century wharfing statutes did not 
contain a clear expression of an intent to abandon the public trust interest in 
the lands covered by the wharves); see also City of Berkeley v. Sup. Ct., 606 P.2d 
362 (Cal. 1980) (ruling that tidelands granted to private parties under an 1870 
statute remained subject to public trust obligations). 
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ensure that they were used for public purposes,58 and that the 
railway owned the lands in fee simple subject to the condition 
subsequent that the lands be used for railroad, wharf, or storage 
purposes.59 Thus, the state had the right to reclaim title to the 
lands if they were devoted to purposes inconsistent with the 
public trust doctrine.60  These cases illustrate the transformative 
nature of the public trust doctrine.  They show that the doctrine 
functions not to destroy private property but to modify it in order 
to ensure that private uses conform to trust purposes. 
V.   THE TRUST DOCTRINE AS A PUBLIC EASEMENT 
ON PRIVATE PROPERTY 
More commonplace than transferring fee simples into 
defeasible fees are court decisions that interpret the public trust 
doctrine to impose a easement on fee simple estates.  Perhaps the 
most vivid example is the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
recognition in Matthews v. Bay Head that the doctrine burdened 
private beaches with a public easement.61  The scope of this 
easement was not merely access to the ocean but also included 
recreational rights to sunbathe on the beach.62  But the New 
Jersey court did not apply the public trust to all private beaches, 
adopting an accommodation principle similar to that espoused by 
the California Supreme Court’s Mono Lake decision that 
accounted for the location of the beach, the extent and availability 
of alternatives, the amount of public demand, and usage by the 
landowner.63  Application of these Mathews factors64 led the New 
 
58. Vermont, 571 A.2d at 1132 (citing Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712, 721). 
59. Id. at 1135. 
60. Id. (noting that “[t]his means that the State has the right of re-entry in 
the event that the condition is breached by the railroad.”) 
61. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
62. Id. at 365 (finding that “[t]he bather’s right in the upland sands is not 
limited to passage. Reasonable enjoyment of the foreshore and the sea cannot be 
realized unless some enjoyment of the dry sand is also allowed. The complete 
pleasure of swimming must be accompanied by intermittent periods of rest and 
relaxation beyond the water’s edge.”) 
63. Id. 
64. Referred to as a reasonableness test by the court. Nat’l Home Ass’n 
Builders v. New Jersey Dep’t. of Envtl Prot., 64 F.Supp.2d 354, 359 (D. N.J. 
1999) (holding that no taking resulted from a requirement that developers of 
filled tidal lands provide a 30-foot walkway with public access, due to the 
application of the public trust doctrine). 
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Jersey Supreme Court to conclude in the 2005 case of Raleigh 
Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club that a private beach 
had to be opened to the public at a reasonable fee, the amount to 
be determined by the state.65  The Mathews beach access factors 
provide a paradigmatic example of the accommodation principle 
by allowing the courts to balance public access with private rights 
to exclude.66 
A public easement to use beaches has also been the result of 
the application of a doctrine closely related to the public trust: 
customary rights.67  The pioneering case was the Oregon Supreme 
Court’s 1969 decision in Thorton v. Hay, where the court ruled 
that the public’s use of Oregon’s beaches was ancient enough and 
prominent enough to establish a public easement quite similar to 
that later recognized by the New Jersey Supreme Court under 
the public trust doctrine.68  Although the court later limited 
public rights to access Oregon beaches to those that were 
 
65. Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d 112, 124 
(N.J. 2005). 
66. As one commentator noted, the factors announced in Mathews 
demonstrate how a court can balance the public right of access with private 
property rights. See Mackenzie S. Keith, Judicial Protection for Beaches and 
Parks: The Public Trust Above the High Water Mark, 16 HASTINGS W.-NW J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 165, 179 n. 94 (2010). (“For example, where the upland beach 
is removed from the ocean, other public beaches are nearby, public demand for 
the upland beach is minimal, and the private landowner is making use of her 
upland beach, the private landowner should be able to exclude the public.”) 
67. The public trust and customary rights doctrines share a number of 
characteristics. First, they both reward old uses. Second, they protect 
established public uses. Third, they allow private uses that are consistent with 
public uses. But customary rights require more demonstrable and uniform 
historic public uses than the public trust doctrine requires. See Thorton v. Hay, 
462 P.2d 671, 677 (Or. 1969) (recounting the Blackstonian elements of 
customary rights). 
68. Thorton, 462 P.2d at 677 (paraphrasing Blackstone as to the factors 
relevant to a finding of customary rights, including the ancient nature of the 
use; continuous use without interruption; peaceable use free from dispute; 
reasonable use or use appropriate to the land and the community; visible 
boundaries to provide certainty concerning the extent of the public easement; 
obligatory, in the sense that the public use was not at landowners option; and 
consistent with other customs and laws). See also State ex rel. Hannon v. Fox, 
594 P.2d 1093, 1101 (Idaho 1979) (recognizing customary rights where all seven 
of the Blackstonian elements were met). 
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adjacent to the ocean,69 the doctrine of custom was resoundingly 
reaffirmed in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach.70  Several other 
state courts have adopted the customary rights doctrine as a 
vehicle for recognizing a public easement in ocean beaches.71 
The states recognizing a public trust or customary rights 
easement for beach access have in effect moved the lineal 
delineation of public rights upland, away from the traditional 
boundary at the water’s edge.  They have been joined by other 
states which have applied the public trust doctrine to parklands.72  
The frontiers of the public trust doctrine no doubt lie in such 
upland resources with great public value.  This amphibious 
evolution is only a continuation of the doctrine’s historical 
advance from tidal to inland navigable waters.73 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The accommodation principle that the Mono Lake court and 
subsequent cases have implemented has become the chief 
 
69. MacDonald v. Halverson, 780 P.2d 714, 724 (Or. 1989) (determining that 
a beach at a freshwater pool separated from the ocean, which the public did not 
historically use, was not subject to public customary rights). 
70. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456 (Or. 1993) 
(concluding that the Oregon doctrine of customary rights was a background 
principle under the Lucas framework). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice 
O’Connor, dissented from the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, 
acknowledging the difficulty in reviewing a takings claim without developed 
facts in the courts below but arguing that the Court should hear the petitioner’s 
due process claim that the Oregon customary rights doctrine was pretextual or a 
historical), cert. denied 510 U.S. 1207, 1209 (1994). 
71. See, e.g. Public Access Shoreline Hawaii by Rothstein v. Hawai’i County 
Planning Comm’n by Fujimoto, 903 P.2d 1246, 1263 (Haw. 1995); Matcha v. 
Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1986); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-
Rama, Inc., 294 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1974). See generally JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. 
ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND §§ 5.26, 6.2, 6.3 (2001) 
(collecting articles on beach access). Texas beach access was strengthened in 
2009, when the voters overwhelmingly approved Proposition 9, an amendment 
to the Texas Constitution which, inter alia, declared that “[t]he public, 
individually and collectively, has an unrestricted right to use and a right of 
ingress to and egress from a public beach. The right granted by this subsection 
is dedicated as a permanent easement in favor of the public.” See Tx. H.R.J. Res. 
102 (2009) (approved Nov. 3, 2009, amending TX CONST. Art. 1), available at 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki /index.php/Texas_Proposition_9_(2009). 
72. See supra note 34; Keith, supra note 66, at 179-87 (collecting cases). 
73. See Scott Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious?, 1 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 107 (1986). 
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characteristic of the public trust doctrine’s effect on private 
property.  By imposing on the state a continuous supervisory duty 
to attempt to preserve trust assets74 Mono Lake ruled that 1) 
there were no vested private rights that limited the trust,75 2) 
private grantees use rights were limited by the trust 
responsibility,76 and 3) the state was not confined to erroneous 
past decisions.77  All of these interpretations were means to 
implement the feasible accommodation for which the court called.  
This accommodation meant that there would be a balancing of 
public and private rights in fulfilling the trust responsibility,78 
which is hardly an evisceration of private property, unless private 
property means a kind of private sovereignty immune from state 
control.  That sort of private property exists only in libertarian 
dreamworld. 
This review of representative public trust case law reveals 
the doctrine to be not so much an anti-privatization concept as a 
vehicle for mediating between public and private rights in 
important natural resources.  Courts have accomplished this 
accommodation of public and private rights sometimes through a 
geographical division, sometimes through a conceptional division, 
sometimes through allowing small privatizations of public 
resources, sometimes through a transformation of the definition 
of the private property interest, and sometimes through 
recognition of a public easement on private property.  In none of 
 
74. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
75. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712, 721, 727 (trust doctrine bars any claim of a 
vested right to harm trust resources). 
76. Id. at 722-23 (citing People v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79 (Cal. 1913)); 
Berkeley v. Sup. Ct., 606 P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980). See also Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 
724 (“[n]o one could contend that the state could grant tidelands free of the trust 
merely because the grant served some public purpose.”) 
77. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 723, 728 (trust doctrine gives the state the 
continuing power to revok[e] previously granted rights and enforce “the trust 
against lands long thought free of the trust . . . the state is not confined by past 
allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light of current knowledge or 
inconsistent with current needs.”) 
78. Id. This balancing was especially evident in the court’s discussion of 
water rights, where the economy of the state was built in large part on water 
diverted from streams, it would be disingenuous to hold all such diversions were 
improper, that as a matter of practical necessity the state may have to approve 
appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public trust uses, but the state had 
to take the public trust into account to the extent feasible and preserve, so far as 
consistent with the public interest, the uses protected by the public trust. 
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these cases have the courts eliminated private property, but they 
have employed the public trust doctrine to recognize public rights 
in private property.  Recognition of the nature of the 
accommodation between public and private rights that is 
accomplished by application of the public trust doctrine will no 
doubt not assuage its libertarian critics, but it might lead to more 
constructive conversations about the nature of public rights in 
privately owned land.79 
 
79. See, e.g., FREYFOGEL, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 11, at 15-20 
(correcting the “half-truth” that private property is primarily an individual 
right, the keystone of all other rights), 131-56 (discussing “the responsible 
landowner,” including trust responsibilities, managing interconnected resources, 
the evolving nature of property rights, and supplying a suggested landowner’s 
bill of rights); FREYFOGEL, THE LAND WE SHARE, supra note 11, at 101-34 
(discussing various justifications for private property and showing how property 
rights and responsibilities have evolved over time). See also Alexandra B. Klass, 
Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699 (2006) (discussing the modern public trust doctrine, 
which is not only based on its traditional common law origins but also statutory 
and constitutional trust provisions). 
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